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ACKNOWLEDGING AND PROTECTING 
AGAINST JUDICIAL BIAS AT FACT-FINDING 
IN JUVENILE COURT 
Prescott Loveland* 
ABSTRACT 
As a public defender, I often represent young people from twelve 
to seventeen years old in juvenile court.  My juvenile clients face a 
wide range of accusations and they come from various family 
circumstances.  Nearly all of my juvenile clients, however, are young 
people of color from under-resourced communities.  Many find 
themselves arrested for typical adolescent behavior and others are 
accused crimes that they did not commit.  When counseling juvenile 
clients, I carefully explain the nuances of the juvenile justice system 
that is now aggressively examining their lives.  I strive to provide 
information that will help them make informed decisions in court 
proceedings that treat them like adults despite their still-developing 
adolescent brains.  To some of my clients, for example, I must explain 
that unless your behavior is nearly perfect in the coming months, you 
may not be home with your family for a long time. 
To many clients, I must explain the role of the judge in juvenile 
court.  Despite what you have seen on television, I explain, a judge—
not a jury—will decide whether or not you are “guilty” of the “crime” 
that you are accused of.  When making this decision, the judge will be 
aware of all sorts of information that the judge is not permitted to 
consider.  The judge, for example, knows if you have been in trouble 
before.  The judge knows your family’s financial struggles, your 
challenges at school, and the difficulties you may have had following 
court orders.  The judge might even know if you have not been 
following the rules at home.  To some clients, I also explain that the 
judge will know about your statement to the police even after the 
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judge tosses it from the case because you did not “confess” 
voluntarily.  I explain that the law requires us to act as if the juvenile 
court judge is simply able to ignore all this information when making 
the decision about whether you did what the police say you did.  At 
this point, juveniles often become aware that the juvenile court 
process has some dangerously unfair features. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judges, not juries, are the fact-finders in juvenile court because 
most states do not recognize a jury right for juveniles.1  Failing to 
adequately protect juveniles from the biases of juvenile court judges 
can lead to innocent juveniles and their families being involved in a 
juvenile justice system that has very serious consequences.  This Essay 
outlines how judges came to be the fact-finders in juvenile court and 
explains ways that juvenile court judges are uniquely susceptible to 
several types of bias that can undermine fact-finding.2  The distorting 
influence of judicial biases can lead to inaccurate fact-finding and, in 
turn, to the improper adjudication of children as “delinquent.”  
Further, the failure to limit apparent bias can lead juveniles to 
perceive juvenile court as inherently unfair, thereby undermining 
their willingness to participate and their broader opinion of the justice 
system.  The risk of judicial bias at fact-finding in juvenile court can 
and should be minimized by using juries or other protective 
procedures.3 
Part I of this Essay provides a brief history of the jury trial and of 
juvenile courts.  Part I also discusses the procedural protections that 
the Supreme Court has extended to juvenile court, and the Court’s 
decision in McKeiver to not extend a constitutional jury trial right to 
juvenile court.  Part II describes various forms of judicial bias that can 
undermine fact-finding in juvenile court and it briefly discusses some 
features of the jury trial system that can shield against bias.  Part III 
discusses how courts and policy-makers can protect juveniles from 
judicial bias by either extending the jury right to juvenile court or by 
instituting other protective measures. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE JURY TRIAL AND OF JUVENILE COURT 
This Part provides a brief overview of the jury trial protection in 
criminal court and of the juvenile justice system, including the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 5:3 (2d ed. 2017). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
286 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
Supreme Court’s extension of certain Due Process protections to 
juvenile court. 
A. The American Jury Trial 
An accused person’s right to a trial by jury has long been vital to 
the American criminal justice system.4  The jury, as Justice Hugo 
Black noted, is “one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in 
the English-speaking world.”5  The jury traces back to the Magna 
Carta in 1215, and it underpinned English common law.6  Trial by jury 
was adopted by the Framers when the U.S. Constitution was ratified, 
was included in the Bill of Rights via the Sixth Amendment,7 and was 
incorporated to the states as a fundamental right through the 
Fourteenth Amendment.8  Every state has adopted the right to a jury 
trial in their state constitutions9 and has passed legislation 
guaranteeing the right to a jury trial in serious criminal cases.10  The 
Supreme Court has made clear that the Sixth Amendment guarantee 
of a trial by jury in criminal cases is “fundamental to the American 
scheme of justice.”11 
The architects of the American justice system made the jury 
foundational to assure fairer trials and to protect from “corrupt or 
overzealous government action” including the biases of judges.12  In 
deciding that the jury trial right is fundamental, the Supreme Court 
explained in clear terms how important the jury is to check 
government power: 
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and 
experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded 
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968). 
 5. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 34 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 6. See, e.g., Andrew Treaster, Juveniles in Kansas Have a Constitutional Right 
to a Jury Trial. Now What? Making Sense of In re L.M., 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1275, 
1277–78 (2009) (discussing historical antecedents of the right to a jury trial); see also 
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 8. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 
(holding that a right to a jury trial is a fundamental right applicable to states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 9. See Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy 
Relationship with the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 991–92 (2010); see also Javier M. 
Vazquez, Appropriate Treatment for Juvenile Offenders: Juvenile Justice System v. 
Jury System, 1 BARRY L. REV. 185, 199 (2000). 
 10. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 154. 
 11. Id. at 149; see also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210–11 (1968). 
 12. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 199. 
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too responsive to the voice of higher authority.  The framers of the 
constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted 
upon further protection against arbitrary action.  Providing an 
accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an 
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor 
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge . . . .  [T]he jury 
trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a 
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a 
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the 
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.  Fear of unchecked 
power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other 
respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon 
community participation in the determination of guilt or 
innocence.13 
The jury also lends legitimacy to the adjudication process.  The jury 
is the primary link between courts and the communities that the 
courts are supposed to serve.  Through jury service, the community is 
involved in the important decisions that courts make about life, 
liberty, and justice.  Since the inception of the American legal system, 
juries have brought the community to the courtroom, helped “temper 
the legal mind with a healthy dosage of common sense and human 
emotion,”14 and have supplied a “nexus between the legislature’s 
original intent and the community’s sense of justice.”15 
B. The American Juvenile Court 
The first juvenile court was created in Illinois in 1899.16  By 1925, 
nearly every state had some process aimed at adjudicating juveniles 
accused of crimes differently than adults.17  The founders of juvenile 
courts hoped that a separate system for juveniles would be one of the 
generation’s great contributions to the status of children in American 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added). 
 14. W.J. Keegan, Jury Trials for Juveniles: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 PAC. L.J. 811, 
835–36 (1977). 
 15. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 199 (citing Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile 
Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 244–46 
(1984)). 
 16. See Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the 
Role of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 376 
(1998). 
 17. Gerald P. Hill, Revisiting Juvenile Justice: The Requirement for Jury Trials in 
Juvenile Proceedings Under the Sixth Amendment, 9 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 143, 145 
(2008); see also Jennifer M. Segadelli, Minding the Gap: Extending Adult Jury Trial 
Rights to Adolescents While Maintaining a Childhood Commitment to 
Rehabilitation, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 683, 686 (2010). 
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society.18  Juvenile courts inquired more deeply into juveniles’ 
individual circumstances, such as school, family, home life, and court 
history.19  An overarching ideal of these new juvenile courts was 
rehabilitation over punishment.20  Parens patriae, often considered 
the founding principle of American juvenile justice, is the idea that 
the state has a duty to intervene and care for so-called “troubled” 
children.21  Juvenile courts sought to be more sympathetic and less 
formal, and to make determinations about the best interests of 
children who were perceived as “youngsters whose crimes were the 
product of immaturity.”22 
In an effort to protect juveniles from the harsh strictures of the 
adult criminal system, unique features were introduced, such as closed 
and confidential hearings, clinical examinations, broad and exclusive 
jurisdiction, more lenient sentencing, and judges rather than juries as 
fact-finders.23  The judge’s role expanded to one that was all-
encompassing: managing the case, learning about the juvenile’s life, 
ruling on evidentiary disputes, sentencing juveniles, and also—despite 
all the inadmissible information the judge was privy to—adjudicating 
guilt through bench trials rather than jury trials.24 
Regardless of the intent to create a system that was unique from 
the adult criminal justice system, juvenile courts have evolved to 
closely resemble adult criminal courts over the last fifty years.  For 
instance, juvenile justice in every state has shifted toward an approach 
                                                                                                                 
 18. David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Juvenile Courts in the Early Twentieth 
Century: Beyond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 42, 45 (Margaret K. Rosenheim, Franklin E. Zimring, David S. Tanenhaus & 
Bernardine Dohrn eds., 2002). 
 19. See generally William Hannan, Judicial Waiver as the Only Equitable Method 
to Transfer Juvenile Offenders to Criminal Court, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 193, 197–98 (2008). See also DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, 
CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 478–79, 499 (3rd ed. 
2007). 
 20. Hill, supra note 17, at 145; see also Segadelli, supra note 17, at 689. 
 21. DAVID L. MYERS, EXCLUDING VIOLENT YOUTHS FROM JUVENILE COURT: THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 12–13 (2001). 
 22. ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 4 (2008); see also Hannan, supra note 19, at 193, 196; Stacey Sabo, Rights of 
Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2425, 2430 (1996). 
 23. Tanenhaus, supra note 18, at 69–70; see also Segadelli, supra note 17, at 689. 
 24. See Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics for 
Contemporary Reforms, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 216, 231–32 (Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014) 
(describing the contrast between the early juvenile court where the judge had 
tremendous power and discretion over all matters of the case and the post-Gault 
expansion of prosecutorial power at the expense of judicial and probation authority). 
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“that often holds young offenders to the same standard of criminal 
accountability [as] adults.”25  The resemblances between juvenile and 
adult courts are now apparent in how juveniles are regarded, in the 
procedural rights they are afforded,26 in the similarities between 
juvenile and adult jails, and in the punishments received.27  The 
jurisdiction of juvenile court also continues to shrink as more 
juveniles are transferred to adult court.28  Increasing numbers of 
children are receiving adult-like sentences and are being prosecuted 
in juvenile court for normal juvenile behavior.29 
Some scholars attribute this punitive shift in juvenile justice to the 
Due Process procedural protections extended to juvenile courts by 
the Supreme Court.30  Other commentators perceive the shift as a 
hasty response to an increase in juvenile crime in the 1970s through 
1990s.31  During that time, people and politicians became increasingly 
uneasy with the informality of juvenile courts and skeptical of 
juvenile courts’ ability to properly handle juveniles who were 
considered violent.32  Prompted in part by sensationalized juvenile 
crime,33 people latched on to a fiction of the so-called juvenile “super 
predator,” now commonly recognized to be a veiled racial term used 
to frighten support for harsher treatment of juveniles of color.34  The 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22. 
 26. See discussion infra Section I.C. 
 27. Margaret K. Rosenheim, The Modern American Juvenile Court, in A 
CENTURY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 342; see also Segadelli, supra note 
17, at 715; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22. 
 28. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 4–5. 
 29. See Andrea L. Dennis, Decriminalizing Childhood, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 
5 (2017); see also Rosenheim, supra note 27, at 342. 
 30. See Klein, supra note 16, at 377–78. 
 31. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 4–5, 11, 94, 105; see also Michelle 
Haddad, Catching Up: The Need for New York State to Amend Its Juvenile 
Offender Law to Reflect Psychiatric, Constitutional and Normative National Trends 
Over the Last Three Decades, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 455, 484 
(2009). 
 32. Rosenheim, supra note 27, at 342; Segadelli, supra note 17, at 689. 
 33. Segadelli, supra note 17, at 689; see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at    
4–5. 
 34. See Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-
bus-recalls-superpredator-threat-of-90s.html [https://nyti.ms/2k1jqTu]; John Kelly, 
Juvenile Transfers to Adult Court: A Lingering Outcome of the Super-Predator 
Craze, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Sept. 28, 2016), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/
juvenile-justice-2/juvenile-transfers-adult-court-lingering-outcome-super-predator-
craze/21635 [https://perma.cc/7VGJ-Q55G]; Kirsten W. Savali, For the Record: 
‘Superpredators’ is Absolutely a Racist Term, THE ROOT (Sept. 30, 2016), 
http://www.theroot.com/for-the-record-superpredators-is-absolutely-a-racist-t-17908
57020 [https://perma.cc/Z8H9-AHWY]. 
290 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
punitive shift in juvenile justice grew from highly impulsive legislative 
overhauls as sweeping changes were made to juvenile justice policies 
with hardly any debate or review.35  No doubt, these punitive changes 
detracted from meaningful investment in a juvenile justice process 
that was data-driven or truly rehabilitative. 
Now resembling adult criminal courts, juvenile courts have strayed 
far from their founding principles.36  Some features of juvenile justice, 
however, remain distinct.  In most jurisdictions, for instance, care and 
rehabilitation remain the stated purpose of the juvenile court, 
probation officers are involved early in the process, and a number of 
less harsh sentencing options are still available.37  Importantly, in 
most jurisdictions, judges, not juries, remain the juvenile court fact-
finders.38 
C. Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court 
The Supreme Court has recognized a number of constitutional 
rights for juveniles facing criminal accusations.  In 1967, the Supreme 
Court decided In re Gault.39  Fifteen-year-old G.G. faced charges that 
he placed a lewd phone call to a neighbor.40  For this “crime” an adult 
offender would receive a $50 fine and no more than sixty days in 
jail.41  Young G.G. was convicted and committed to an “industrial 
school”—that is, a juvenile prison—for six years, until age twenty-
one.42  During the process of adjudication, G.G. was denied 
procedural rights to which an adult offender would have been 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See Klein, supra note 16, at 377–78; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 4–
5. 
 36. See Haddad, supra note 31, at 484–90; see also CTR. FOR CHILDREN’S LAW & 
POLICY, POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE: PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND POLICY PREFERENCES 
FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS REFORM 2 (2007), https://www.macfound.org/
media/article_pdfs/CCLPPOLLINGFINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/7L8P-DDQH]. 
See generally SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 11–13.  In recent years, federal 
incentives, state policies, and public opinion reflect a potential shift back towards 
more rehabilitative approaches in some states. 
 37. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at § 1:3; see also NEELUM ARYA, CAMPAIGN FOR 
YOUTH JUSTICE, STATE TRENDS: LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES FROM 2005 TO 2010: 
REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (2010), 
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7M6Z-3MHX] (comparing requirements between adult and juvenile 
systems). 
 38. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at § 5:3. 
 39. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 40. Id. at 4. 
 41. Id. at 8–9; see also DEAN JOHN CHAMPION, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
DELINQUENCY, PROCESSING, AND THE LAW 52 (4th ed. 2003). 
 42. Segadelli, supra note 17, at 690. 
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entitled.  He was, for example, never provided an opportunity to face 
or question his accuser, he was not advised that he had the right not 
to make a statement, he was subjected to proceedings during which 
witnesses were not sworn, and transcripts were not made.43 
In re Gault went to the Supreme Court and, in a landmark 
decision, the Court held that, as in adult criminal court and under the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, juveniles accused of 
crimes have the right (1) to notice of charges, (2) to counsel, (3) to 
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and (4) to privilege 
against self-incrimination.44  The Court noted that despite the good 
intentions behind the juvenile system, “unbridled discretion . . . is 
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”45  The 
Court’s rationale built on its recent decision in Kent v. United 
States,46 where the Court acknowledged that in juvenile court “the 
child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the 
protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and 
regenerative treatment postulated for children.”47  In Gault, the 
Court addressed some, but not all, of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
rights that had already been afforded to adults accused of crimes.  
Notably, the Court did not meaningfully address the issue of a 
juvenile’s right to a jury trial.48 
A few years later, in 1970, the Court decided In re Winship, a case 
involving a twelve-year-old charged with stealing money from a 
purse.49  The Court in Winship held that the standard of proof to 
which juveniles are entitled is proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
rather than a preponderance of the evidence.50  The Court held that 
the evidentiary standard in juvenile delinquency proceedings must 
align with that of adult criminal proceedings, as “the same 
considerations that demand extreme caution in fact-finding to protect 
the innocent adult apply as well to the innocent child,” particularly 
because an individual’s freedom and autonomy are also at stake in 
juvenile court.51  The Court said that Due Process requires the 
government to produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to ease 
                                                                                                                 
 43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14. 
 44. Id. at 10. 
 45. Id. at 18. 
 46. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 47. Id. at 556. 
 48. Segadelli, supra note 17, at 691. 
 49. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 50. Id. at 367. 
 51. Id. at 365. 
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the minds of the fact-finders and to protect the innocent from 
punishment.52  Yet, the Court said nothing, not even in dicta, about 
how juries also have an important protective purpose, especially 
because of judicial bias.53 
D. McKeiver : No Right to a Jury Trial in Juvenile Court Under the 
Constitution 
In 1971, one year after Winship, the Court decided McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania.54  Despite its increasing willingness to extend Due 
Process protections to juveniles in the face of the juvenile system’s 
shortcomings, the Court, by plurality opinion, held that juveniles do 
not have a right to a jury trial in the fact-finding phase of juvenile 
court.55  Saying very little about judicial bias and citing no meaningful 
data, the plurality conclusively asserted that juries are not necessary 
to accurate fact-finding because juries are not more capable than 
judges of making fact determinations.56  The plurality briefly 
addressed the “worst of both worlds”57 shortcomings of juvenile court 
that were described in Kent and Gault, as well as some of the bias-
related critiques of having a judge as fact-finder.58  But the Court then 
simply reasoned that juries for juveniles would make the proceedings 
too adversarial and risk imposing a criminal court process on juvenile 
court, thereby undermining the need for a separate juvenile court at 
all.59 
In the dissent, Justice Douglas, with Justices Black and Marshall 
joining, espoused that constitutional jury trial rights should be 
extended to juveniles.60  The dissent noted the serious consequences 
of juvenile court, including the substantial restrictions on liberty and 
the similarities between adult jails and juvenile detention centers.61  
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 364; Segadelli, supra note 17, at 691–92. 
 53. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 358. 
 54. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 55. Id. at 545. 
 56. Id. at 543, 547. 
 57. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1, 18 n.23 (1967). 
 58. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 558. 
 61. Id. at 559 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 4 (Black, J., concurring)) (recognizing the 
serious restrictions on liberty that juveniles are subjected to and noting that “[w]here 
a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State, charged, and convicted for 
violating a state criminal law, and then ordered by the State to be confined for six 
years, . . . the Constitution requires that [the juvenile] be tried in accordance with the 
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The dissent also noted two important concepts that the plurality did 
not meaningfully address: the potential for bias among judges and 
juveniles’ perception of whether they are treated fairly.62 
II.  JUDICIAL BIAS IN JUVENILE COURT: A REALITY OFTEN 
IGNORED 
The jury in a criminal trial protects innocent people from the 
adverse consequences of a criminal conviction.  In McKeiver, the 
Court did not extend the jury protection to juveniles despite the 
resemblance between juvenile and criminal court.63  The Court 
asserted that juries have not been necessary for accurate fact-finding, 
citing the absence of juries in equity cases, probate matters, 
deportation hearings, and other civil matters.64  In defense of its 
decision, the Court also cited the Duncan Court’s statement: “[w]e 
would not assert that every criminal trial—or any particular trial—
held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be 
as fairly treated by a judge as [s/]he would be by a jury.”65  The 
McKeiver plurality, however, paid little attention to the concept of 
judicial bias.66 
This Part outlines various biases to which juvenile court judges are 
susceptible.  It also discusses ways that juries are less susceptible to 
these biases and addresses some critiques of the jury system.  The 
potential for judicial bias should not be ignored by lawmakers and 
judges who are considering how to structure fact-finding in juvenile 
courts. 
A. Judicial Biases that Can Undermine Juvenile Court Fact-Finding 
Without a jury or other procedural protections, juvenile court 
judges are susceptible to various types of bias that can undermine 
fact-finding, thereby threatening to subject innocent young people to 
the consequences of a juvenile conviction. 
                                                                                                                 
guarantees of all the provisions of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by 
the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 62. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 562–63. 
 63. See supra Section I.D. 
 64. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. 
 65. Id. at 543 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968)). 
 66. Id. at 552 (White, J., concurring). 
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1. Bias from Exposure to Inadmissible Information 
One of the most apparent biases to which juvenile court judges are 
vulnerable is bias from constant exposure to information that is 
typically not admissible at the fact-finding stage.  Juvenile court 
judges, for instance, preside over hearings where testimony and 
evidence are elicited, such as hearings about whether a juvenile 
should be detained pending trial and hearings about whether a 
juvenile is to be transferred to adult court.67  During the process, 
judges receive information that is often not admissible at trial, 
including information about tangible evidence, alleged identification 
evidence, and alleged statements that children made.68  Juvenile court 
judges also oversee juveniles’ compliance with pre-trial court 
conditions and monitor juveniles’ participation in social service 
programs.69  Thus, judges become intimately aware of information 
that threatens to shape their opinion about accused juveniles before 
fact-finding—that is, before the government is supposed to use only 
admissible evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.70  For 
example, while managing the case, pre-trial judges learn if accused 
children are not abiding by curfew, if they are missing school, if they 
are not reporting to counseling, or even if children are not listening to 
their parents’ rules.71  Similarly, inadmissible information can reach 
the judge “as a result of offhand remarks by a clerk or bailiff made in 
the judge’s presence or even by reviewing the court file.”72 
Even the most careful judges are, after all, human.  And 
psychological evidence and social scientific studies show that humans, 
in general, have great difficulty deliberately disregarding 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and 
Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 553, 584 (1998). 
 68. Id. at 571. 
 69. Cf. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550 (acknowledging “[c]oncern about . . . the 
juvenile court judge’s possible awareness of the juvenile’s prior record and of the 
contents of the social file; about repeated appearances of the same familiar witnesses 
in the persons of juvenile and probation officers and social workers”). 
 70. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 572; accord FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 71. See John Stuart & Philip Bush, It’s Time for Jury Trials in Juvenile Court, 
50 HENNEPIN LAW. 8, 9 (1981) (“[A] juvenile court judge often follows the 
development of a juvenile respondent and his or her family for several years.”). 
 72. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 208; see also Commonwealth v. Goodman, 311 A.2d 
652, 654 (Pa. 1973) (holding that a judge should honor a defendant’s request to recuse 
himself where the judge receives inadmissible evidence during pre-trial that is “highly 
inflammatory”). 
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information.73  Juries, in contrast, are carefully shielded from 
inadmissible information by the rules of procedure and evidence.74  
Juries are shielded from this information precisely because of its 
potential for creating bias; indeed, when the jury is exposed to this 
type of information, it is common grounds for granting a mistrial.75 
Yet, juvenile judges have regular access and exposure to this 
inadmissible information and are expected to play “mental 
gymnastics” by ignoring it.76  This is a fiction that the rest of the 
justice system, including appellate courts, upholds despite the 
empirical and anecdotal evidence suggesting that prejudicial 
information influences judges’ decisions.77 
2. Political Bias 
Political pressures can also compromise fair decision-making at 
fact-finding.  One study by sociologist Alexes Harris about the 
California juvenile waiver hearing process included interviews with 
juvenile court judges in California.78  Harris found that important 
goals for juvenile court judges were to retain their position and to be 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? 
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1323 (2005); see 
also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 572 (citing Michael J. Saks, What Do 
Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 27 (1997)). 
 74. See, e.g., FED R. EVID. 403. 
 75. See, e.g., JULIE LEWIS ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA DEFENDER MANUAL VOL. 2, 
TRIAL § 31.4 (John Rubin eds., 2d ed. 2012), http://defendermanuals.sog.unc.edu/
sites/defendermanuals.sog.unc.edu/files/pdf/31.4.pdf [https://perma.cc/697D-VYX8]; 
see also Izzy Kapnick, Mistrial Declared in Murder-for-Hire Case Featured On TV’s 
Cops, COURTHOUSE NEWS (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.courthousenews.com/
mistrial-declared-in-murder-for-hire-case-featured-on-cops/ [https://perma.cc/TBF2-
E9UZ]; Judge Declares Mistrial in Roger Clemens Case, THE TAKEAWAY (Jul. 15, 
2011), http://www.wnyc.org/story/146468-judge-declares-mistrial-roger-clemens-case/ 
[https://perma.cc/RWC7-NUDQ]; Mistrial Declared in Clemens’ Perjury Trial, NPR 
(July 14, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/14/137858529/mistrial-declared-in-
clemens-perjury-trial [https://perma.cc/73HX-WAPQ)]. 
 76. See Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 573 (“Although judges 
undoubtedly are better than juries at ignoring or not acting upon inadmissible 
evidence, it strains the imagination to believe that a judge would not be affected by 
knowledge of a confession, if only at an unconscious level.”). 
 77. See id. at 572 (citing Saks, supra note 73, at 27). See generally Wistrich et al., 
supra note 73, at 1251–52. 
 78. Alexes Harris, Diverting and Abdicating Judicial Discretion: Cultural, 
Political, and Procedural Dynamic in California Juvenile Justice, 41 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 387, 392 (2007) (“Thirty years after the ‘constitutional domestication’ of the 
juvenile court, a more punitive approach to crime and justice increasingly guides the 
juvenile system.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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promoted beyond juvenile court.79  Judges commonly “sought to 
create reputations that would generate prestige and connections to 
elected [office].”80  Judges were concerned about how their judging 
abilities were perceived by the public, including the views of police, 
media, and government agencies.81  With surprising candor, for 
example, judges admitted that implications for their reputation makes 
them sentence more severely.82 
Harris helps demonstrate that legally irrelevant factors such as 
personal ambition, the perceptions of others, and favoritism for more 
conservative case outcomes can unduly influence judicial decisions at 
fact-finding.  Based on the openness of the judges in the Harris Study, 
one can easily imagine a judge who, under political pressure, is 
influenced to rule against young people at fact-finding or who is 
reluctant to truly hold the government to its burden of proving a case 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Jurors, on the other hand, are simply not subject to the same 
political pressures.  They are not typically affiliated with the court 
system, and individual juror decisions on a verdict are not subject to 
the same level of transparency or scrutiny from other judges, from 
police, or from government agencies.83 
3. Situational Bias 
Judges are also susceptible to situational biases, that is, extraneous 
variables that should have no bearing on legal decisions.  In one oft-
cited study by Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso,84 researchers 
recorded how parole decisions made by experienced judges related to 
the judges’ two daily food breaks.85  This study found that favorable 
rulings for legally similar cases dropped gradually from about sixty-
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 399; see also Michele Benedetto Neitz, A Unique Bench, A Common 
Code: Evaluating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 132 
(2011). 
 80. Harris, supra note 78, at 399. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Neitz, supra note 79, at 132. 
 83. Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 528 (2014) (holding that jurors may not 
testify about what went on during deliberations, even to expose dishonesty during 
jury selection); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (“[L]ong-recognized 
and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from 
intrusive inquiry.”). But see Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 866 (2017) 
(noting an exception to the usual rule that jury deliberations are secret when 
evidence of extreme racial or ethnic bias emerges). 
 84. Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889, 6889 (2011). 
 85. Id. 
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five percent to zero percent within each period between food breaks 
and then rose again abruptly to about sixty-five percent immediately 
after a break.86  Ultimately, the likelihood of a favorable ruling was 
greater at the very beginning of the work day or after a food break 
than it was later in the succession of cases.87 
This study bolsters a growing body of evidence suggesting that 
experienced judges are indeed susceptible to psychological biases, 
even small psychological biases associated with their particular 
situation.88  The danger of bias is real: “legally irrelevant situational 
determinants—in this case, merely taking a food break—may lead a 
judge to rule differently in cases with similar legal characteristics.”89  
The extent to which the results of this study translate from a parole to 
a fact-finding context is not entirely clear.  However, if something as 
simple as a food break threatens the outcome of judicial decision-
making, one can easily imagine other legally irrelevant circumstances 
that have undue influence—such as the amount of sleep a judge has 
had, the sadness a judge is feeling, or the amount of stress a judge is 
under at home. 
While situational biases are not unique to judges, and can of course 
have some impact on jurors as well, the design of the jury system 
provides some inherent protection against such biases.  The jury is a 
group making a fact-finding decision about one case, rather than an 
individual judge repeatedly making decisions about multiple, often 
similar, cases.90  Jurors as a group of decision-makers serve to check 
and balance one another’s small psychological influences. 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. at 6889; see also Ed Yong, Justice is Served, but More So After Lunch: 
How Food-Breaks Sway the Decisions of Judges, DISCOVER MAG.: NOT EXACTLY 
ROCKET SCI. (Apr. 11, 2011), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/notrocketscience/
2011/04/11/justice-is-served-but-more-so-after-lunch-how-food-breaks-sway-the-
decisions-of-judges/#.WgtACRNSzow [https://perma.cc/PQ29-HSP7]. 
 87. Danziger et al., supra note 84, at 6890. 
 88. Id. at 6892; see also Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 777, 782 (2001); Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, 
Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property 
Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 96 
(1987); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2011). See generally Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with 
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts Judicial 
Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188 (2006); Neil Vidmar, 
The Psychology of Trial Judging, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 58 
(2011).  
 89. Danziger et al., supra note 84, at 6892. 
 90. See infra Section II.B.1. 
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4. Bias from Having Multiple Roles and a Repetitive Job 
Juvenile court judges are susceptible to bias by virtue of the many 
different roles they serve in juvenile court, the pressures associated 
with those roles, and by the repetitive nature of their jobs. 
In addition to being fact-finders, for example, juvenile court judges 
also sentence juveniles, manage the progression of the case, direct 
and manage the courtroom, and monitor pre-trial release 
conditions.91  In the process, judges frequently hear reports about the 
juveniles from probation officers, social workers, and agencies.92 
Managing busy court calendars can create pressure that 
undermines their fact-finding decisions.  Juvenile courts—often 
“perceived as less important”93—are frequently not resourced well 
enough, which adversely affects staffing.94  Heavy judicial caseloads 
can create increased anxiety about greater efficiency.  For judges who 
are under consistent pressure to be more efficient, an excessive 
docket makes it “difficult to spend the time you want on each case,”95 
creating the risk of spending insufficient time and attention on fact-
finding.  These multiple responsibilities and pressures create a risk 
that important facts will be missed or forgotten by the juvenile court 
judge.96 
Further, the repetitive nature of sitting in the same court over years 
and hearing the same types of cases increases judges’ familiarity with 
police officers, probation officers, as well as with particular juveniles 
and certain neighborhoods.97  Dealing with cases similar to those that 
they have heard in the past risks that judges will base decisions on 
factual precedent and prejudices, rather than on the unique 
circumstances presented by each case.98  For example, a judge’s 
experience presiding over many criminal and juvenile cases may make 
judges “unduly skeptical of the testimony of the accused . . . [because] 
they tend to hear the same stories repeatedly.”99  Jaded perspectives 
or insufficient attention to the testimony of an accused juvenile can 
undercut fact-finding.  Familiarity with police officers can as well.  If 
                                                                                                                 
 91. See Feld, supra note 15, at 231; see also infra Section II.B. 
 92. See Feld, supra note 15, at 231; see also infra Section II.B. 
 93. Neitz, supra note 79, at 115 (quoting Leonard P. Edwards, The Juvenile Court 
and the Role of the Juvenile Court Judge, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 26 (1992)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See discussion infra Section II.B.1. 
 97. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 208–09. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.; see also Guggenheim & Hertz, supra note 67, at 579. 
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judges assume, based on experience, that a certain officer is 
trustworthy, they will naturally tend to “presume that the officer will 
not lie [and will therefore be] less likely to subject the officer’s 
testimony to . . . rigorous scrutiny that would expose possible 
untruths.”100  Judges will be “likely to presume that [any] 
inconsistenc[ies are] the result of a mistake or misunderstanding, 
rather than from fabrication.”101 
Juries, on the other hand, are not as susceptible to the same biases 
and pressures associated with role and repetition.  Jury service is 
infrequent and jurors are routinely excluded from any cases where 
they are familiar with a witness or party, and they are instructed to be 
singularly focused on the evidence and its application to the law.102  
The protection of a jury decreases the risk of overlooking salient facts 
because, simply, there are more people paying attention.  Indeed, as 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged, members of a group may 
remember testimony that other group members have forgotten.103  
The pressures to multi-task and to be efficient are not as heavy on 
jurors as they are on juvenile judges.  While jurors may seek to wrap 
cases up quickly to get home to their families or get back to work, the 
external pressures facing judges are simply not present for the jury. 
5. Corruption Bias 
Many of the biases discussed to this point are biases that can be 
subtle or inadvertent on the part of judges.  Judges, however, are also 
more susceptible than juries to intentional biases.  Corruption bias, 
for instance, is engaging in illegal activity from the bench.  Accepting 
bribes or favors and participating in illegal ex parte communications 
are common enough to demand sufficient protection against such 
behavior.  In early 2011, two juvenile court judges in Pennsylvania—
Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan—were convicted of receiving 
millions of dollars from private juvenile detention facilities in 
exchange for sending young people to those facilities after 
adjudicating them delinquent.104  Hundreds of young people and their 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Vazquez, supra note 9, at 208. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See, e.g., 1-II Criminal Jury Instructions for DC Instruction 2.102 (2017). 
 103. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233 (1978). 
 104. Neitz, supra note 79, at 98; John Schwartz, Clean Slates for Youth Sentenced 
Fraudulently, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/27/us/
27judges.html [https://nyti.ms/2gZOfJg] (noting that youth advocacy groups often 
complained about the unusually harsh nature of Judge Ciavarella’s adjudications); 
Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youth for 
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families were affected when these two judges detained children in 
facilities away from their homes, families, and schools.105  Without 
doubt, perceptions of fairness about the process were undermined as 
well. 
While incarcerating children in exchange for cash is, indeed, an 
extreme example of corruption bias among judges, it is far from the 
only example.  Judges have engaged in illegal ex parte 
communications, inappropriate sexual relationships, collusion, 
inappropriate comments, preferential treatment,106  and overt 
racism.107  While many judges strive to be impartial and fair, far too 
many have proven susceptible to corruption, which threatens fact-
finding as well as all other aspects of the juvenile court process, 
thereby undermining the legitimacy of the institution. 
                                                                                                                 
Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/
13judge.html [https://nyti.ms/2jGLG0i]. 
 105. See Neitz, supra note 79, at 98; Schwartz, supra note 104; Urbina & Hamill, 
supra note 104. 
 106. See, e.g., In re Esworthy, 77 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y. 1991) (per curium) 
(upholding decision of State Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove juvenile 
court judge from bench for, among other things, making inappropriate comments 
during a juvenile delinquency proceeding); see also Former Circuit Court Judge 
Reprimanded for Improper Sexual Relationship, WBKO (Feb. 24, 2017), 
http://www.wbko.com/content/news/Former-Circuit-Court-Judge-reprimanded-for-
improper-sexual-relationship-414739073.html [https://perma.cc/YS8H-2X4C]; Jason 
Grant, Judge Quits Bench Amid Alleged Duct Tape Threat, Ex Parte Talks, N.Y. 
L.J. (Aug. 16, 2017), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202795663177/Judge-
Quits-Bench-Amid-Alleged-Duct-Tape-Threat-Ex-Parte-Talks?slreturn=20170816
141054 [https://perma.cc/3SSM-57SZ]; Max Mitchell & Lizzy McLellan, As Officials 
in Centre County Face Discipline, Appeals May Follow, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 
(Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202797180584/As-Officials-
in-Centre-County-Face-Discipline-Appeals-May-Follow?slreturn=20170816142547 
[https://perma.cc/4JC2-8CBN]; Alex Wolf, 2 Philly Judges Removed for Case Fixing 
Scheme, LAW360 (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/875085/2-philly-
judges-removed-for-case-fixing-scheme [https://perma.cc/BN8V-2L6M]. 
 107. Neitz, supra note 79, at 131 (“[A] juvenile court judge in Tennessee was 
publicly censured for his habit of ruling against immigrant juveniles ‘based solely on 
the real or perceived immigration status’ of the children or their parents.  In a formal 
Letter of Reprimand, the Court of the Judiciary noted that this judge’s actions 
displayed ‘a perceived predetermination as to Hispanic individuals appearing before 
[him].’”) (citing Formal Letter of Reprimand from the Hon. Don R. Ash, Presiding 
Judge, Tenn. Court of the Judiciary, to the Hon. A. Andrew Jackson, Dickson Cty. 
Gen. Sessions Judge, (May 16, 2008), [hereinafter Formal Letter of Reprimand] 
http://www.tba2.org/tbatoday/news/2008/judicialreprimand_051608.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X345-RE7P]); see also Aldrich v. State Comm’n on Judicial 
Conduct, 447 N.E.2d 1276, 1277 (N.Y. 1983) (per curium) (upholding decision of 
State Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove juvenile court judge from bench for 
using “profane, improper and menacing language” and making “inappropriate racial 
references” during proceedings). 
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The jury, while of course not immune from illegality,108 is by design 
more insulated from ex parte communications and overt illegality 
because juries are composed of multiple members that check one 
another,109 and their communications are limited and carefully 
monitored.110  Bribing a juror is far more difficult since their identity 
is unknown until they are selected for trial, which gives little time to 
approach them.111 
6. Racial Bias 
Juvenile court judges are susceptible to racial bias, both explicit 
and implicit.  Judges themselves have acknowledged the problem of 
bias.  U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Bernice B. Donald 
candidly acknowledged to a group of judges and lawyers at the 2016 
ABA Annual Meeting: “[e]ach of us in doing our jobs are viewing the 
functions of that job through the lens of our experiences, and all of us 
are impacted by biases, stereotypes and other cognitive functions that 
enable us to take shortcuts in what we do.”112 
Concerns over racial bias in juvenile court are underscored by 
pervasive racial disparities in the juvenile justice system.113  Black 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See, e.g., Alberto Luperon, Jessica Chambers Murder Trial Juror Booted 
After Posting on Facebook, LAW NEWZ (Oct. 11, 2017), https://lawnewz.com/high-
profile/juror-dismissed-in-jessica-chambers-murder-trial-after-posting-on-facebook/ 
[https://perma.cc/LT82-CFVX]; Kelly Puente, Did a Juror Get Too Chatty at a 
Fountain Valley Nail Salon, Putting a Murder Conviction in Trouble?, ORANGE 
COUNTY REG. (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.ocregister.com/2017/10/12/did-a-juror-get-
too-chatty-at-a-fountain-valley-nail-salon-putting-murder-a-conviction-in-trouble/ 
[https://perma.cc/GD6Z-ZQVF]; Eric Shorey, October 17, 1931: Al Capone 
Convicted for Tax Evasion, OXYGEN (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.oxygen.com/blogs/
october-17-1931-al-capone-convicted-for-tax-evasion [https://perma.cc/3ZUP-6UQ5]. 
 109. See discussion infra Section II.B.1. 
 110. See, e.g., 1-II Criminal Jury Instructions for DC Instruction 2.509 (describing 
the very limited ways in which jurors are authorized to communicate with parties). 
 111. See RANDOLF N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 16 (2003). 
 112. Judges: 6 Strategies to Combat Implicit Bias on the Bench, AM. BAR ASS’N 
(Sept. 2016) [hereinafter 6 Strategies], https://www.americanbar.org/publications/
youraba/2016/september-2016/strategies-on-implicit-bias-and-de-biasing-for-judges-
and-lawyer.html [https://perma.cc/U24F-HUZY]. 
 113. See Perry Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: An 
Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 289 (2008) 
(“Over the last thirty years, a number of increasingly sophisticated analyses have 
documented a statistically significant ‘race effect’ on juvenile justice outcomes.”); 
Margaret Olesnavage, Disproportionate Representation of Children of Color in the 
Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice Systems in Michigan, 89 MICH. B.J. 26, 26 (2010) 
(“Youth of color are overrepresented at nearly every point of contact with the 
juvenile justice system.”); Miriam Stohs, Racism in the Juvenile Justice System: A 
Critical Perspective, 2 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 97, 109–10 (2003) 
(discussing statistics illustrating racial discrepancies at every stage of the juvenile 
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students in Florida, for example, were two and one-half times more 
likely than white students to be arrested and referred to the juvenile 
justice system in 2007–2008.114  Latino students in Colorado were fifty 
percent more likely than white students to be referred to law 
enforcement in 2006–2008.115 
Statistically, black youth receive more severe sanctioning than 
similarly situated white youth,116 receive harsher sentences for certain 
behaviors,117 and are more likely to be held in secure detention which 
statistically correlates with harsher sanctions in later proceedings 
when compared to white youth.118  Black youth are also more likely 
than white youth to receive a court referral for prosecution, rather 
than to participate in a diversion program,119 and are 
disproportionately removed from their homes.120 
Often, the juvenile system is a backstop for inadequate mental 
health care in communities of color.121  Black males, especially those 
with mental health struggles, “are more likely to be referred 
to . . . delinquency court than a treatment system.”122 
Particularly concerning is the interplay between schools and 
juvenile courts.  The school-to-prison pipeline epidemic plagues U.S. 
schools, as students of color—as well as students with a history of 
                                                                                                                 
justice process); Franklin E. Zimring, Minority Overrepresentation: On Causes and 
Partial Cures, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra 
note 24, at 169–86. 
 114. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW “ZERO 
TOLERANCE” AND HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-
PRISON PIPELINE 19 (2010) (internal citations omitted), https://b.3cdn.net/
advancement/d05cb2181a4545db07_r2im6caqe.pdf [https://perma.cc/486L-XWPP]; 
Neitz, supra note 79, at 132. 
 115. ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, supra note 114, at 19; Neitz, supra note 79, at 132. 
 116. See Michael J. Leiber et al., The Likelihood of a “Youth Discount” in 
Juvenile Court Sanctions: The Influence of Offender Race, Gender, and Age, 6 RACE 
& JUST. 5, 8 (2016), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2153368715595088 
[https://perma.cc/G5NR-L38M]; see also MICHAEL J. LEIBER, THE 
DISPROPORTIONATE OVERREPRESENTATION OF MINORITY YOUTH IN SECURE 
FACILITIES: A SURVEY OF DECISION MAKERS AND DELINQUENTS 1, 54 (1993), 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/dmc/pdf/disproportionate.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3JN-ABUN]. 
 117. See Leiber et al., supra note 116, at 8–9. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 122. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN  JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY CASES 13 (2005) [hereinafter JUVENILE DELINQUENCY GUIDELINES]; 
Neitz, supra note 79, at 131–32; see also Thalia González, Youth Incarceration, 
Health, and Length of Stay, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 45, 48, 52 (2017).  
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abuse, neglect, poverty, or learning disabilities—are 
disproportionately targeted by policies that suspend, expel, and arrest 
boys and girls for infractions in school.123 
Explicit racial bias (as opposed to implicit racial bias) can, in 
theory, be more easily rooted out among judges because it is more 
apparent than implicit bias.124  However, evidence increasingly shows 
that implicit bias is pervasive and that measures of implicit bias are 
dissociated from measures of explicit bias.125  In other words, a judge 
would not need to hold explicit biases to be implicitly biased. 
Of course, racial disparities in the juvenile system are not all 
attributable to judicial biases.  But the discretion of juvenile court 
judges “could allow personal racial bias or prejudice to have an 
enhanced role in adjudications.”126  The pervasiveness of racial 
disparities alone warrants maximum systemic protection against the 
influence of racial bias in juvenile court. 
Jurors are also susceptible to racial bias; however, the jury trial has 
more substantial methods for protecting against such biases, including 
voir dire, to root out prospective jurors with discernible biases, 
Batson precedent to help ensure a more diverse composition of 
juries,127 the ability of defendants to challenge convictions when 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See Carla Amurao, Fact Sheet: How Bad Is the School-To-Prison Pipeline?, 
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jurors overtly rely on racial stereotypes or animus,128 and the 
protective dynamics of group decision-making.129 
B. The Protective Features of a Jury Trial 
This Section briefly discusses three aspects of the jury trial that 
protect against judicial bias: (1) group decision-making, (2) voir dire, 
and (3) jury instructions.  Policy-makers who are deciding how to 
structure fact-finding in juvenile court should carefully consider how 
vital these features are to the integrity of fact-finding. 
1. Group Decision-Making 
The group decision-making feature of a jury trial system has 
significant virtues.  As veteran law professors Martin Guggenheim 
and Randy Hertz have discussed, “the very fact that the 
decisionmaker is an individual rather than a group” can distort the 
perceptions and judgments of juvenile judges.130  The jury model, 
which pulls together various people from the community, helps 
ensure that “a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions, 
and habits” bear on factual decision-making.131  Social science has 
helped to demonstrate that jurors’ tendency to apply their respective 
experiences and perspectives during deliberation enhances their 
evaluation of evidence.132 
Further, a single judge “may fail to notice some meaningful aspect 
of a witness’s demeanor or some highly salient gesture or meaningful 
glance by the witness while on the stand.”133  Drawing from the 
experiences and perspective of just a single judge, rather than a full 
jury, decreases the likelihood that “witnesses’ credibility will be 
assessed accurately and facts correctly found.”134  To present another 
example, while most judges are permitted to take notes during fact-
finding—unlike juries—“even the most assiduous note-taking judge 
may neglect to jot down an important response by a 
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witness . . . because the judge failed to appreciate its significance at 
the time.”135 
Similarly, Guggenheim and Hertz emphasize that while appellate 
review serves as a protection against overt judicial biases, “subtle 
biases such as predispositions based on life experiences or long held 
assumptions” are less apparent on appellate review of a paper 
record.136  Subtle but dangerous biases such as situational biases, 
pressures to be more efficient, and implicit racial biases are “most 
likely to be uncovered—and corrected—by means of an interchange 
between individuals with conflicting perspectives, such as what 
typically occurs during a jury deliberation.”137  Deliberating through 
the lens of competing views and life experiences is undeniably 
beneficial to rooting out biases and to discerning the credibility of 
witnesses and evidence.  The Supreme Court—despite largely 
overlooking the issue in McKeiver—has expounded on the virtues of 
large group decision-making in the jury context.138  Those virtues, 
according to the Court, include meaningful deliberation, 
remembering important facts and arguments, and a broader 
representation of the community, including representation of 
“minority groups.”139 
2. Voir Dire 
Voir dire is a tool that is unique to the jury model and that 
specifically serves to root out biases among potential fact-finders.  
Voir dire allows attorneys and the court to scrutinize jurors for overt 
and hidden biases.  During voir dire, attorneys and the judge examine 
jurors for experiences or belief-sets that may predispose them to ways 
of viewing a case or an accused person.140  As Vazquez notes: 
In a bench trial, however, there is no analogous opportunity to 
explore the judge’s background.  Without voir dire scrutiny to detect 
the possibility of judicial bias, one must assume that judges have 
incredible powers of self-reflection and are able to attend to their 
conscious and unconscious mental processes and set aside any 
prejudices they might reveal.141 
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Voir dire serves to protect against many of the specific types of biases 
outlined above by, for example, eliminating prospective jurors who 
have had previous experiences with the parties or witnesses in a case 
or who have had too much exposure to subject matter relating to a 
case.142 
3. Jury Instructions 
The process of instructing jurors in a criminal case also allows for 
protection against biases that can undermine fact-finding.  Jury 
instructions allow for meaningful articulation of the law being applied 
as well as an opportunity for appellate review.143  Without jury 
instructions that “explain the judge’s understanding of the law, the 
reviewing court is unable to determine whether the juvenile court 
judge misunderstood or misapplied the law.”144  In bench trials where 
judges are the fact-finders, it is said that, “juveniles lose out twice 
because they are more likely to be convicted at trial and are very 
unlikely to prove an error . . . on appeal.”145  Jury instructions also 
serve as a powerful reminder from the court to jurors to make 
decisions based only on admissible evidence.146 
C. Critiques of the Jury System 
The jury system is, of course, not a perfect method of preventing 
bias from detrimentally influencing fact-finding.  Juries, for example, 
have been known to make decisions based on racial animus.147  Juries 
also often lack racial diversity, which functions to the detriment of 
defendants of color.148  Additionally, recent exoneration data 
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provides a glimpse into how juries can wrongfully convict: since 1989, 
there have been at least 2144 exonerations in the United States,149 
including 20 people who had served time on death row.150 
These dangers, however, are not more poignant in the jury system 
than in bench trials.  On the contrary, anecdotal case data suggests 
that, with alarming frequency, juvenile court judges fail to apply the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard and instead convict on 
insufficient evidence.151 
Another critique of the jury trial is that group decision-making, 
despite its benefits, is shrouded with secrecy, as the public is often not 
privy to the nature and substance of jury deliberations.152  Judges-as-
fact-finders, on the other hand, sometimes back up their application 
of the facts to the law with some analysis, either orally or in writing.  
But the jury system, at least, has the additional protective 
mechanisms discussed above—voir dire, jury instructions, and 
opportunities for advocates to challenge verdicts based on jurors’ 
overt prejudices.153 
Opponents of extending the jury to juvenile court cite the added 
cost and decreased efficiency associated with the jury system.154  
Implementing juries in juvenile court means various expenses 
including jury stipends, additional courtrooms, new judges, and delays 
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associated with selecting, instructing, and litigating before juries.155  
The juvenile system, courts have said, should dispose promptly of 
issues “without all the time-consuming procedures which accompany 
trial by jury.”156  Where juvenile courts are falling short of 
rehabilitation, some argue, adding the expense and delay of a jury 
trial will not advance those rehabilitative aims.157  Further, as the 
court emphasized in McKeiver, many people believe that introducing 
jury trials threatens to “remake the juvenile proceeding into a full 
adversary process and thus substantially deny the possibility that the 
juvenile system would achieve its goals of prompt adjudications, 
fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention.”158 
In light of the increasingly apparent realities of judicial bias, 
however, focus on costs is little more than a policy choice that 
prioritizes efficiency over fairness.  Further, a jury trial process would 
not undermine other rehabilitative features of juvenile court, such as 
diversion options, earlier involvement of probation officers and 
families, access to social service agencies, or sentencing alternatives 
that are less harsh than jail.159 
III.  LIMITING JUDICIAL BIAS IN JUVENILE COURT 
Under McKeiver, jury rights for juveniles are not required by the 
United States Constitution.160  The Court’s rationale in McKeiver 
could one day be revisited in light of the stark realities of today’s 
juvenile court.  Until then, however, McKeiver explicitly left the door 
open for states to extend the protection of a jury in juvenile court.  In 
his concurring opinion, Justice White noted that “[o]f course, there 
are strong arguments that juries are desirable when dealing with the 
young, and States are free to use juries if they choose.”161  This Part 
discusses how, despite McKeiver, specific jurisdictions can and have 
protected against judicial bias by extending jury rights to juveniles 
and by creating procedural protections and mandating bias training. 
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A. In Re L.M.: The Kansas Supreme Court Extends the Jury 
Protection to Juveniles 
In 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court decided In re L.M.,162 which 
extended jury rights to juveniles in Kansas under the Kansas State 
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.163  Sixteen-year-old L.M. was 
charged with aggravated sexual battery as well as being a minor in 
possession of alcohol.164  L.M. was accused of making inappropriate 
sexual contact and comments toward a neighbor.165  L.M. requested a 
jury but was denied, and was found guilty by a judge at a bench 
trial.166  His punishment included probation for five years, sex 
offender treatment, and registration as a sex offender.167 
The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished L.M.’s case from 
McKeiver and extended jury trial rights to juveniles statewide.168  The 
Kansas Supreme Court based its decision not on the risks of judicial 
bias, but on the fact that recent changes to the Kansas juvenile justice 
system had “eroded the benevolent . . . character that distinguished 
[the juvenile system] from the adult system.”169  Specifically, the 
Kansas juvenile code supplanted non-punitive language with more 
punitive language, aligned the juvenile and adult sentencing 
guidelines, and diminished a host of other protections that served to 
distinguish juvenile and adult court, such as private proceedings and 
confidentiality of records.170  As a result, the Kansas Supreme Court 
explained, juvenile justice in Kansas had little differentiation from the 
adult system.171  Without the paternalistic protections previously 
afforded, McKeiver’s rationale did not apply to Kansas, and juveniles 
became entitled to the protection of a jury at fact-finding under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well 
as the Kansas State Constitution.172 
Although judicial bias was not an explicit focus of In re L.M., the 
Kansas Supreme Court nonetheless provided a sound rationale that 
other state courts can follow to extend the jury protection in juvenile 
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court—to acknowledge similarities between juvenile court and adult 
criminal court.  Where state legislatures, as in Kansas, further erode 
the parens patriae features of juvenile court through changes to 
juvenile code provisions, policy-makers and juvenile advocates might 
find ripe ground to argue that the jury protection should be 
reconsidered, McKeiver notwithstanding. 
Certain states, such as Texas, New Hampshire, and Montana have 
followed Kansas’s lead and fully extended jury rights to juvenile 
court, while several other jurisdictions afford the protection only 
under certain circumstances related to age and severity of 
accusation.173  Today, however, in most jurisdictions, judges not juries 
remain the finders of fact despite the risk of judicial bias.174 
B. Ways (Other than a Jury) to Protect Against Judicial Bias 
As statutory creations, juvenile courts can be altered by state 
policy-makers.175  Legislatures, administrative judges, and even 
individual judges can introduce measures to reduce judicial bias.  This 
Section describes ways that policy-makers can—and should—limit 
judicial bias in jurisdictions that do not have jury protections for 
juveniles. 
1. Ensuring Different Judges for Different Phases of the Case 
In some jurisdictions, a juvenile court judge who presides over 
pretrial detention or transfer hearings (during which alleged facts are 
commonly presented) must recuse himself from fact-finding at the 
defense’s request.176  To maximize protections against bias due to 
exposure to inadmissible information, a rule should exist that “all 
pretrial matters, including detention pending trial, transfer to adult 
court, and suppression of evidence, [should] be heard by a judge other 
than the one who will preside over the trial.”177  This different-judge-
for-trial rule can be taken further.  For example, Guggenheim and 
Hertz propose placing a burden on litigants: require them to raise all 
questionable evidentiary issues before trial during motions in limine 
to decrease the chance that the fact-finder will be presented with 
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inadmissible, and potentially prejudicial, information.178  The threat 
of sanctions against the party that fails to present such tainting 
information in limine, however, would need to be meaningful for this 
protective measure to work.179 
Another procedural mechanism—issue-based certification—allows 
for judges to briefly certify cases to other judges to resolve 
evidentiary and other potentially prejudicial issues during trial.180  For 
jurisdictions with only one juvenile court judge, criminal court judges 
or even civil court judges can handle issues that might lead to bias 
because of exposure to prejudicial information.181 
2. Recusal 
Guggenheim and Hertz also suggest less formal mechanisms, such 
as recusal, as a way to protect against judicial bias resulting from 
exposure to inadmissible information.182  Administrative judges who 
set courthouse policies, or individual juvenile judges taking seriously 
their desire to appear fair and to reduce bias, can more liberally 
recuse themselves upon counsel’s motion, or even sua sponte, after 
being exposed to inadmissible information.183  Today, recusal motions 
are rarely requested because they are rarely granted, since judges 
generally uphold the fiction that they are not prejudiced by exposure 
to information they are not supposed to consider. 
3. Seeking Advisory Juries and Group Deliberation 
Courts and individual judges can also “modify the [juvenile] bench 
trial model to secure some of the virtues of careful, thorough 
deliberation” that exists in the jury system.184  For example, to 
incorporate the virtues of group decision-making such as the benefit 
of various perspectives,185 judges can follow the possibility raised by 
the McKeiver court, that is, to empanel advisory juries.186  
Guggenheim and Hertz propose a less formal and more convenient 
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approach that could have a similar effect: judges can routinely discuss 
cases with their fellow judges before rendering a verdict.187 
4. Utilizing Jury Instructions in Bench Trials 
To further protect against bias, juvenile judges can borrow the 
important feature of jury instructions.  Despite the prominence of 
jury instructions in guiding juries prior to deliberation, judges in 
bench trials rarely instruct themselves by explaining what law they are 
applying to a fact-finding decision.  Requiring judges to verbalize the 
jury instructions they are applying—or, even better, to incorporate 
instructions into written findings—can help to eliminate unconscious 
bias, to remind judges of the standard of proof, and to ensure that 
judges are deciding cases on applicable law rather than inadmissible 
information to which they have been exposed.  The use of instructions 
by judges would have the added benefit of allowing attorneys and 
appellate courts to better understand the legal standards that judges 
applied or failed to apply to a case and to take appropriate action on 
appeal. 
5. Managing Situational Biases Through Increased Self-Awareness 
Courts and individual judges should also work to understand and 
protect against situational biases that unnecessarily influence legal 
decisions.  As the Danziger et al. study188 suggests, favorable rulings 
in legally similar cases can vary based on the temporal proximity of 
those decisions to a judge’s food break or to the beginning of the 
workday.189  Common experience dictates that human decision-
making can be influenced by exhaustion, anxiety, sadness, and 
hunger.  Juvenile court judges should make a point of reflecting with 
their colleagues about what life circumstances may unduly influence 
their decision-making and then work to postpone important fact-
finding decisions when they are experiencing grief, exhaustion, or 
even if they have not yet had lunch. 
6. Understanding and Limiting the Influence of Implicit Bias 
The data around bias—especially implicit racial bias—and its likely 
contribution to racial disparities in the juvenile system is problematic.  
Courts and individual judges should receive bias training and should 
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adopt techniques to understand and mitigate the influence of implicit 
bias.  As social psychologists Jeffrey Rachlinski, Judge Andrew 
Wistrich, and law professors Chris Guthrie and Sheri Lynn Johnson 
found: “when judges are aware of a need to monitor their own 
responses for the influence of implicit racial biases, and are motivated 
to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”190  Additionally, 
researchers at the National Center for State Courts have emphasized: 
Avoiding the influence of implicit bias . . . is an effortful, as opposed 
to automatic, process and requires intention, attention, and time.  
Combating implicit bias, much like combating any habit, involves 
“becoming aware of one’s implicit bias, being concerned about the 
consequences of the bias, and learning to replace the biased 
response with non-prejudiced responses—ones that more closely 
match the values people consciously believe that they hold.”191 
In 2016, the American Bar Association hosted a workshop that 
sought to invest some of the “intention, attention and time” necessary 
to combat implicit bias.192  The workshop was for state and federal 
judges from around the country and examined the problem of implicit 
bias and explored practical strategies that judges can utilize to “de-
bias.”193  The workshop featured a bias training video called “Hidden 
Injustice: Bias on the Bench.”194  The video features well-known 
judges, law professors, and experts.195  It raises awareness of implicit 
bias and provides practical methods of understanding and combating 
it.196  The video and similar resources can serve as important tools for 
judges.197  The following techniques and strategies, for example, are 
recommended on a weekly basis as a way that judges (and everyone, 
for that matter) can mitigate their implicit biases: 
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 Take the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”).  The IAT helps 
increase awareness by identifying stereotypes that affect, often 
unknowingly, personal perceptions of the character and qualities 
of different races and ethnic groups. 198 
 Individuation.  Gather specific information about a person (e.g., 
background, family) so that judgments consider the particulars 
of a person rather than assumed group characteristics.199 
 Replace stereotypes.  Recognize when we are “responding to a 
situation or person in a stereotypical fashion” and consider the 
reasons for this response.  Then actively replace the biased 
response with an unbiased one.200 
 Engage in counter-stereotypic imaging.  After detecting a 
stereotyped response, think of well-known people that 
undermine the stereotype, thereby “provid[ing] concrete 
examples that demonstrate the inaccuracy of stereotypes.”201 
 Perspective-taking.  Assess the emotional damage of stereotyping 
by considering the perspectives of stereotyped people.  Thinking 
about, for example, how it would feel to be viewed certain ways 
because of your appearance.202 
 Increase opportunities for contact.  Seek positive interactions 
with stereotyped groups.  Participate in events, for example, that 
allow for meeting people who disconfirm stereotypes.  Change 
the movies, TV and news that we consume to features that do 
not portray groups stereotypically.203 
Utilizing these techniques appears to have had demonstrable impact 
on the prevalence of implicit bias.204 
Likewise, in 2013, several researchers from the National Center for 
State Courts (“NCSC”) published Addressing Implicit Bias in the 
Courts, which provides over a dozen practical strategies that 
individuals and courts can take to reduce the influence of implicit 
bias.205  The NCSC recommends, for example, diversity training as 
well as the development of guidelines and the use of deliberative 
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decision-support tools among decision-makers.206  The NCSC 
recommends that judges consult with colleagues to increase 
deliberative thinking and to decrease the intuitive thinking in which 
implicit biases linger.207  The NCSC also recommends that courts 
review areas where judges are over-burdened and consider options 
for modifying procedures to provide more time for decision-
making.208 
Courts and individual judges should acknowledge the realities of 
implicit bias among judges and the potential impact that bias likely 
has on the overrepresentation of people of color in the juvenile justice 
system.  They should follow the lead of the recent American Bar 
Association conference and the National Center for State Courts by 
prioritizing the resources available to understand and reduce implicit 
bias. 
C. The Importance of Juveniles Perceiving Juvenile Court to Be 
Fair 
Policy-makers who assume, as the Supreme Court apparently 
has,209 that fact-finding in juvenile court is not undermined by judicial 
bias should still consider how important it is that our young people 
perceive their experience in juvenile court as fair.  Juveniles of course 
recognize the dangers of biased judges.  Juveniles can understand the 
risk of being pre-judged at fact-finding by a judge who is exposed to 
inadmissible information, a judge who is too focused on hurrying the 
proceedings along, or a judge who has prejudices toward certain 
juveniles because of how they look or where they are from.  Juveniles 
understand that people struggle to intentionally ignore information 
they have been exposed to.  Even if a judge can control his or her 
biases when making decisions, the risk is real that the fact-finding 
process without juries or other procedural protections does not 
appear fair to the young person whose future is being litigated. 
Significant criminological research suggests that “when citizens 
perceive justice system agencies to be fair, they are more likely to 
comply with the law, legal authorities and court mandates.”210  
                                                                                                                 
 206. Id. at 66–67. 
 207. Id. at 68. 
 208. Id. at 67. 
 209. See supra Section I.D. 
 210. M. SOMJEN FRAZER, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, THE IMPACT OF THE 
COMMUNITY COURT MODEL ON DEFENDANT PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS: A CASE 
STUDY AT THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER 3 (2006) (citing TOM R. 
TYLER & YUEN HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION 
316 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
Studies of mediation211 and of domestic violence courts212 also 
support the notion that perceptions of fairness affect one’s decision to 
accept the outcome of the court process and to comply with its 
mandates.213 
Somewhat surprisingly, research also suggests that litigants’ 
opinions about court experiences are based more on procedural 
fairness than they are on the outcome of a case.214  Indeed, having a 
neutral and trustworthy decision-maker is one of the key dimensions 
informing the perceptions of fairness among court-involved people.215  
The appearance of an impartial judge enhances the sense that court is 
fair.216 
Jury trials and the other procedural protections that are outlined 
above not only limit opportunities for judicial bias, but these 
protections serve to limit the perception of unfairness during juvenile 
court fact-finding.  Among malleable young people who are 
developing their beliefs about the justice system, a process that 
appears fair to them is important for the legitimacy of juvenile court 
as an institution and for the likelihood that young people will follow 
the mandates that the court may impose. 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, the jury trial as a protection for the accused has been 
fundamental to the American concept of justice.217  The Supreme 
Court, however, did not broaden this protection to juvenile court 
despite all the other constitutional rights that were extended to that 
forum.218  The Court rationalized this, in part, by concluding that even 
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though liberty interests are at stake and juvenile courts now resemble 
adult courts, the jury protection is still not necessary because judges 
are as competent as juries at fact-finding.219  The Court, however, said 
little about the reality of judicial bias.220 
Social science has helped show that juvenile court judges are 
uniquely susceptible to various forms of bias.221  Their fact-finding 
decisions can be unduly influenced by legally irrelevant information, 
ranging from when their last food break was to implicit racial 
stereotypes.222  Although jurors are not immune to such influences, 
features of the jury trial—such as group decision-making, voir dire, 
and the practice of jury instructions—mitigate the dangers of such 
biases among jurors.223 
Those who oppose juries and other procedural protections against 
judicial bias in juvenile court often cite concerns of efficiency and 
sparse resources.224  This is a valid concern because juvenile courts 
are under-resourced and understaffed.225  Indeed, most of the 
protective measures suggested in this Essay would slow down the 
juvenile adjudication process and would require that additional 
resources be directed to juvenile court.  However, with the evidence 
of judicial bias mounting, fact-finding is not the place to cut costs.  
Doing so risks over-involving innocent young people in a juvenile 
system that has serious consequences.226  Resources in juvenile court 
can be conserved in other ways.  The government, for instance, can 
stop arresting and adjudicating children for typical teenage behavior, 
or it can make substantially greater use of non-court diversion 
options.227 
If the United States Supreme Court and state courts do not protect 
juveniles with a jury trial, then policy-makers and judges should 
institute procedural protections and awareness training that limits 
judicial bias.228  Limiting judicial bias at fact-finding will better 
protect children and will inform the extent to which young people 
perceive the juvenile justice system as fair.229  If young people believe 
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the process to be fair they are more likely to comply with its 
requirements and respect the justice system as a whole.  We must 
strive to better protect our young people from judicial bias at fact-
finding.  The lives of our young people, simply put, matter too much 
to prioritize efficiency over fairness. 
